The next definition, 'Piety is that which is loved of the gods,' is
shipwrecked on a refined distinction between the state and the act,
corresponding respectively to the adjective (philon) and the participle
(philoumenon), or rather perhaps to the participle and the verb
(philoumenon and phileitai). The act is prior to the state (as in
Aristotle the energeia precedes the dunamis); and the state of being loved
is preceded by the act of being loved. But piety or holiness is preceded
by the act of being pious, not by the act of being loved; and therefore
piety and the state of being loved are different. Through such subtleties
of dialectic Socrates is working his way into a deeper region of thought
and feeling. He means to say that the words 'loved of the gods' express an
attribute only, and not the essence of piety.
Then follows the third and last definition, 'Piety is a part of justice.'
Thus far Socrates has proceeded in placing religion on a moral foundation.
He is seeking to realize the harmony of religion and morality, which the
great poets Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Pindar had unconsciously anticipated,
and which is the universal want of all men. To this the soothsayer adds
the ceremonial element, 'attending upon the gods.
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